Can someone who is knowingly working illegally in the UK still put forward a claim of racial discrimination arising from her treatment by her unlawful 'employers'? Not according to the Court of Appeal in the case of Hounga v Allen [2012] EWCA Civ 609. Ms Hounga, a Nigerian national, was employed by the Allen family as an au pair. She did not hold a work permit and both she and her employers knew that her employment was unlawful. When she was sacked she brought claims for race discrimination as well as unfair dismissal, breach of contract, unpaid wages and holiday pay. All the claims except for race discrimination were rejected by the ET on the basis that she had no lawful contract of employment.

That problem did not affect her race discrimination claim because it was not dependent on there being a valid and legal contract of employment.

The Court of Appeal was asked to consider, along with other issues, whether Ms Hounga could bring a race discrimination claim even though she was working illegally. In deciding this point the Court analysed two cases Hall v Woolston Hall Leisure Ltd [2001] ICR 99 and Vakante v Governing Body of Addey and Stanhope School (No 2) [2005] ICR 231.

In Hall the claimant was allowed to bring a sex discrimination claim even though she had acquiesed in an ongoing illegallity by her employer whilst in Vakante an illegal immigrant was prevented from bringing a claim.

The Court held that there was no conflict between the two cases, in the case of Ms Hall there was no active participation by her in the illegality merely acquiescence once she realised that her employer was acting illegally whilst in Vakante by contrast he was an active party in the illegality.

Applying the same principles to the case of Ms Hounga she similarly was fully aware that she was not legally allowed to work and, even though the Court accepted that she was a vulnerable person, she nevertheless could not bring a claim which arose out of her illegal conduct.

As Lord Justice Rimer put it "If this court were to allow her to make that case, and so rely upon her own illegal actions, it would be condoning her illegality. That is something the court will not do".

Is it unlawful discrimination on the grounds of marital status if a spouse is dismissed (or suffers some other detriment) on the grounds of being married to a particular person?

No, says the EAT (Underhill P) in Hawkins v Atex Group, unless the ground for the less favourable treatment is specifically marriage, as opposed to a close relationship which takes the form of marriage.

The Claimant was employed for less than a year by a company her husband managed when a policy prohibiting employment of close relatives was implemented, leading to her (and her daughter's) dismissal. An employment tribunal struck out her claim of unlawful discrimination on the grounds of marital status, and her appeal failed.

The EAT observed that in this case, there was no general rule or criterion applied by the employer about married women, the decision to dismiss applied to the Claimant and her daughter, and the Respondent was not motivated, in whole or in part, by the fact that the Claimant was married to her husband.

The EAT considered and departed from the recent case of Dunn v Institute of Cemetery and Crematorium Management under which detriments arising from being married to a particular person, not only being married, could found a marital status discrimination complaint, and doubted some of the reasoning in Dunn. So there is a conflict of authority on this point. The EAT noted that it had been referred to an authority not cited in Dunn.

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that Christian hotel owners Mr & Mrs Bull discriminated against civil partners Messrs Preddy & Hall by refusing to allow them to share a double-bed.

The Chymorvah Hotel in Cornwall operated a strict policy refusing double bedrooms to unmarried couples. Upholding the County Court's decision, the Court of Appeal held that the Claimants - having undergone a civil partnership ceremony - should be treated the same way as a married couple, and the only reason they were treated differently was because they were gay.

Of interest is the Court's decision to reject Mr & Mrs Bull's Article 9 argument, ie that the 'no unmarried couples' policy was simply a manifestation of their religious belief. The Court held that if they chose to run a business, they had to run it in accordance with the law - which includes an obligation not to discriminate against potential customers on grounds of their sexual orientation.